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1. Introduction      
The modern information society will continue to emerge, and demand for wireless 
communication services will grow. Future generation wireless networks are considered 
necessary for the support of emerging services with their increasing requirements. Future 
generation wireless networks are characterized by a distributed, dynamic, self-organizing 
architecture (I. F. Akyildiz et al., 2006). These wireless networks are broadly categorized into 
different wireless networks according to their specific characteristics. Typical examples 
include Ad-Hoc/Mesh Networks, Sensor Networks, Cognitive Radio Networks, etc as 
shown in figure 1. These wireless networks could then constitute the infrastructure of 
numerous applications such as emergency and health-care systems, military, gaming, 
advertisements, customer-to-customer applications, etc. Not only their importance in 
military applications is growing, but also their impact on business is increasing. The 
emergence of these wireless networks created many open issues in network design too. 
More and more researchers are putting their efforts in designing the future generation 
wireless networks. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Different kinds of wireless networks 
Every node in the future wireless network is capable of changing its operation 
independently or in a small group of nodes according to the current dynamics of the 
network as all the nodes are distributed and self-organizing in nature. So every node in the 
network has conflicting situation with other nodes, and hence it is very hard to analytically 
model such network and to evaluate its performance.   
Source: Convergence and Hybrid Information Technologies, Book edited by: Marius Crisan,  
 ISBN 978-953-307-068-1, pp. 426, March 2010, INTECH, Croatia, downloaded from SCIYO.COM
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2. Game Theory 
Game Theory is a collection of mathematical tools to study the interactive decision problems 
between the rational players1 (here it is wireless nodes). Furthermore it also helps to predict 
the possible outcome of the interactive decision problem. The most possible outcome for any 
decision process is “Nash Equilibrium.” A Nash equilibrium is an out come of a game where 
no node (player) has any extra benefit for just changing its strategy one-sidedly. From the 
last three decades game theory has not just applied to economics but has also found 
application in sociology and psychology, political science, evolution and biology. 
Additionally, it has drawn lots of attention from computer scientist in recent because of its 
use in artificial intelligence, cybernetics, and networks. Specifically, Game theory allows us 
to model scenarios in which there is no centralized entity with full/partial information 
network conditions. Because of that from last few years game theory has gained a notable 
amount of popularity in solving communication and networking issues. These issues 
include congestion control, routing, power control and other issues in wired and wireless 
communications systems, to name a few. Figure 2 shows the applications of game theory, 
especially in computer science while figure 3 shows few key research areas in wireless 
networking (M. Felegyhazi et al., 2006).   
As we mentioned earlier game theory is a branch of applied mathematics which helps 
players to analyze decision making in conflict situations. Such situations arise when two or 
more players, who have different aims act on the system or share the same resources. A 
game could be two player or multi-player. In a given game, game theory provides 
mathematical process for selecting an optimum response to player to face his/her opponent 
who also has a strategy of his/her own. 
 
Fig. 2. Applications of game theory  
 
                                                 
1 In rest of the paper we keep using terms ‘node’ and ‘player’ interchangeably.  
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Fig. 3. Few key research areas in networking 
2.1 Game theory: assumptions, challenges, advantages, and classification 
In game theory (generally non-cooperative game theory) players usually make the following 
assumptions  
• Each player has two or more well-specified moves/strategies. 
• Every player has possible combinations of moves/strategy that leads to an optimum 
response (End-state like win, loss or draw) in a given game. 
• Each player has a specified payoff for each optimum response. 
• All players are rational; that is, each player, given the two moves/strategies, will choose 
that one that gives him/her the better payoff.  
The use of game theory to analyze the performance of wireless networks is not without its 
challenges. We point out few challenges as follows:  
• Assumption of rationality  
• Realistic scenarios require complex model 
• Choice of utility functions 
• Mechanism design 
• Mapping variables in the game 
We will learn more about these challenges in subsequent sections of this chapter. Even with 
these challenges we have certain advantages in using game theory for analyzing wireless 
networks   
• Analysis tool for distributed systems: As we mentioned earlier game theory is a 
natural choice to study the distributed systems as both deal with independent decision 
makers. With game theory we can investigate the steady state of such systems and also 
make the out come of an individual node both in the interest of the system and its own.  
• Cross layer designing and optimization:  In wireless networking, a node often needs to 
take its action based on some other layers to optimize its own performance but this 
could hurt the performances of that particular layers. In this situation game theoretic 
approach can provide a proper insight as well as mathematical back ground to optimize 
the overall protocol stack’s performance.  
• Incentive Scheme: As we mentioned above the selfishness of nodes is the biggest threat 
to the performance of the network and it’s necessary to remove or discourage the selfish 
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behavior of nodes. Game theory tools such as mechanism design can assists the 
network designer to develop some networks rules that can discourage the nodes form 
selfish behavior and in some case provide some incentives for actively participation in 
network. Hence, we can get the desired outcome of the nodes from a network point of 
view. 
Games can be classified formally at many level of detail, here; we in-general tried to classify 
the games for better understanding.  As shown in the figure 4 games are broadly classified 
as co-operative and non-cooperative games. In non-cooperative games the player can not 
make commitments to coordinate their strategies. A non-cooperative game investigates 
answer for selecting an optimum strategy to player to face his/her opponent who also has a 
strategy of his/her own. Co-operative game can, and often does, arise in non-cooperative 
games, when players find it in their own best interests. 
Conversely, a co-operative game is a game where groups of player may enforce to work 
together to maximize their returns (payoffs).Hence, a co-operative game is a competition 
between coalitions of players, rather than between individual players. There are lots of 
fundamental things need to be discussed about co-operative games which are simply out of 
the scope of this chapter. Furthermore, according to the players’ moves, simultaneously or 
one by one, games can be further divided into two categories: static and dynamic games. In 
static game, players move their strategy simultaneously without any knowledge of what 
other players are going to play. In the dynamic game, players move their strategy in 
predetermined order and they also know what other players have played before them. So 
according to the knowledge of players on all aspects of game, the non-cooperative/co-
operative game further classified into two categories: complete and incomplete information 
games. In the complete information game, each player has all the knowledge about others’ 
characteristics, strategy spaces, payoff functions, etc., but all these information are not 
necessarily available in incomplete information game (M. Felegyhazi et al., 2006, M.J. 
Osborne & A Rubinstein , 1994, V. Srivastava et. al , 2005). 
 
 
Fig. 4. Classification of games 
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A game is set of there fundamental components: A set of players, a set of actions, and a set 
of preferences. Players or nodes are the decision takers in the game. The actions (strategies) 
are the different choices available to nodes. In a wireless system, action may include the 
available options like coding scheme, power control, transmitting, listening, etc., factors that 
are under the control of the node. When each player selects its own strategy, the resulting 
strategy profile decides the outcome of the game. Finally, a utility function (preferences) 
decides the all possible outcomes for each player. Table 1 shows typical componets of a 
wireless networking game. 
 
Components of a game Elements of a wireless network 
Players Nodes in the wireless network 
A set of actions 
A modulation scheme, Coding 
rate, transmit power level, etc. 
A set of preferences 
Performance metrics (e.g. 
Throughput, Delay, SNR, etc.) 
Table 1. Components of a wireless networking game 
It is important to note that game theory models are only appropriate for the scenarios where 
decision of a node could impact the outcome of other nodes. Hence, a clear distinction 
should be drawn between a multiple decision making problem and an optimization 
problem where a single decision making entity is involved. Furthermore, appropriate 
modelling of preferences is one of the most challenging aspects of the application of game 
theory, so optimizing network’s performance with game theory needs careful considerations 
(V. Srivastava et. al, 2005). 
2.2 Game theory: networks games 
 
 
Fig. 5. Networks games at different levels of protocol stack  
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As shown in the figure 5 game theory can be applied to the modeling of a wireless network 
at the physical layer, link layer, and network layer. Applications at the transport layer and 
above exist also, but we restrict our discussion up to network layer. At all the mentioned 
levels we can formulate a game to optimize the performance of a network. The main 
objective of these games is to remove the selfish behavior of the nodes. Generally, selfish 
behavior is very serious problem for overall network performance. For example a node 
always refuse to forward data packets from other node can create unnecessary partition in 
the network, and hence limit the connectivity of the network.Here, we briefly describe a few 
games at different levels of protocol stack (M. Felegyhazi et al., 2006).  
Physical Layer Games: 
• Power Control and waveform Adaptation games: These games are representing very 
basic problems of improving performance at physical layer. At physical layer 
performance is generally measure in terms of signal to interference plus noise ratio at 
the nodes. When the nodes in a network respond to changes in perceived SINR by 
adapting their signal, a physical layer interactive decision making process occurs. This 
signal adaptation can occur in the transmit power level and the signaling waveform In 
power control game signals of other terminals can be modeled as interfering noise 
signals, the major goal of this game  is to achieve a certain signal to interference (SIR) 
ratio regardless of the channel conditions while minimizing the interference due to 
terminal transmit power level. Waveform adaptation in wireless networks involves the 
selection of a waveform by a node such that the interference at its receiver is reduced. 
The interference at the receiver is a function of the correlation of a user’s waveform with 
the waveforms of the other users in the network. Also, in general, the individual nodes 
involved in transmission have no or very little information about the receiver’s 
interference environment. Hence to minimize the adaptation overhead, distributed 
waveform adaptation algorithms that require a minimal amount of feedback between 
receivers and transmitters need to be developed for these networks. 
MAC Layer games: 
• Medium Access Games-The slotted aloha and DCF Games: In these medium access 
control games, selfish users seek to maximize their utility by obtaining an unfair share 
of access to the channel. This action, though, decreases the ability of other users to 
access the channel. In slotted Aloha game, in a given slot, each user has two possible 
actions: the user can transmit or wait. If exactly one user chooses to transmit in a given 
slot, then that user’s transmission is successful. If multiple users transmit in a slot, then 
all of their transmissions are unsuccessful. We assume that the payoff associated with a 
successful transmission is 1, while the cost of transmission (whether successful or 
unsuccessful) is c, where 0 < c < 1. A user who waits will receive a payoff of 0; a user 
who transmits will receive a payoff of either 1 – c (if the transmission is successful) or –c 
(if the transmission is unsuccessful).In this game main aim is to maximize the payoff (in 
terms of less cost) with fair  access to the Medium. Similar to slotted aloha game, when 
a node has data to transmit, it autonomously decides when to transmit in IEEE 802.11 
DCF based networks. Because the wireless channel is a shared channel, the 
transmission of a node often interferes with those of other nodes. For example, if there 
are two neighboring nodes transmitting their data frames simultaneously, both 
transmissions will fail. Therefore, one node must compete with its neighboring nodes so 
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that it can transmit as many packets as possible.  Authors in (M. Felegyhazi et al., 2006) 
model the IEEE 802.11 DCF with game theory and name the model the DCF game. In 
the DCF game, each player (node) has two strategies: Transmit or Not transmit (i.e., 
wait) and here again aim is the same as slotted aloha game. 
Network Layers Games: 
The main functionalities of network layer are establishing and updating routes and 
forwarding the packets along those routes.  The presence of selfish nodes in those routes can 
degrade the overall network performance as well as the life time.  
• Forward’s dilemma and Joint packet forward games: In forwards dilemma game, as 
shown in figure 6 (a) the p1 intends to send a packet to node r1 through p2, while 
player p2 intends to send a packet to r2 through p1. The cost of transmitting a packet 
equals c, where c << 1 and reflects the energy spent by a node in forwarding a packet. If 
a packet is successfully received by the receiver then the sender gets a reward of 1. Each 
player has two possible actions: forward the packet (F) or drop the packet (D) of the 
other player. Similar to this game , in the joint packet forwarding game as shown in 
figure 6 (b)  nodes intend to send a packet to node r through two intermediate nodes p1 
and p2. If the packet successfully reaches r then each of the forwarding nodes gets a 
reward of one, otherwise none of the intermediate nodes gets any reward. The cost of 
forwarding a packet is c and has the same meaning as that in the forward’s dilemma 
game. The players may take two actions: forward the packet (F) or drop the packet (D). 
The aim of both these game is to maintain the routing path as long as possible and 
hence a network connectivity (M. Felegyhazi et al., 20062). 
 
 
Fig. 6. (a) Forward’s Dilemma problem and its game form presentation 
 
Fig. 6. (b) Joint Packet Forward problem and its game form presentation  
3. Case study: IB based MAC protocol for wireless sensor networks 
Communication in wireless sensor networks is divided into several layers. One of those is 
the Medium Access Control (MAC) layer. MAC is an important technique that enables the 
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successful operation of the network. MAC protocol tries to avoid collisions so that two 
interfering nodes do not transmit at the same time. The main design goal of a typical MAC 
protocols is to provide high throughput and QoS. However, a good amount of energy gets 
wasted in traditional MAC layer protocols due to idle listening, collision, protocol overhead, 
and over-hearing (W. Ye  et al , 2002).  
There are some MAC protocols that have been especially developed for wireless sensor 
networks. Typical examples include S-MAC, T-MAC, and H-MAC (W. Ye et al , 2002, T.V. 
Dam et. al , 2003, S.Mehta et al, 2007). To maximize the battery lifetime, sensor networks 
MAC protocols implement the variation of active/sleep mechanism. S-MAC and T-MAC 
protocols trades networks QoS for energy savings, while H-MAC protocol reduces the 
comparable amount of energy consumption along with maintaining good network QoS. 
However, their backoff algorithm is similar to that of the IEEE 802.11 Distributed 
Coordinated Function (DCF), which is based on Carrier Sense Multiple Access with 
Collision Avoidance (CSMA/CA) Mechanism. The energy consumption using CSMA/CA is 
high when nodes are in backoff procedure and in idle mode. Moreover, a node that 
successfully transmits resets it Contention Window (CW) to a small, fixed minimum value 
of CW. Therefore, the node has to rediscover the correct CW, wasting channel capacity and 
increase the access delay as well. It is necessary to estimate the number of nodes in network 
to optimize the CSMA/CA operation. 
In nutshell, during the CSMA/CA mechanism, backoff window size and the number of 
active nodes are the major factors to have impact on the energy-efficiency as well as the QoS 
performance of WSNs. As presented in (L. Zhao et. al, 2008) the concept of incomplete 
cooperative game theory that can improve energy efficiency as well as the QoS performance 
of MAC protocol in WSNs.  Based on game theoretic model presented in (L. Zhao et. al, 
2008) we use a fixed-size contention window, but a non-uniform, geometrically-increasing 
probability distribution for picking a transmission slot in the contention window interval to 
improve the energy efficiency of MAC protocol.  
3.1 Incomplete cooperative game 
As we mentioned earlier energy efficiency of MAC protocol in WSN is very sensitive to 
number of nodes competing for the access channel. It will be very difficult for a MAC 
protocol to accurately estimate the different parameters like collision probability, 
transmission probability, etc., by detecting channel. Because dynamics of WSN keep on 
changing due to various reasons like mobility of nodes, joining of some new nodes, and 
dying out of some exhausted nodes. Also, estimating about the other neighboring nodes 
information is too complex, as every node takes a distributed approach to estimate the 
current state of networks.  For all these reasons an incomplete cooperative game could be a 
perfect candidate to optimize the performance of MAC protocol in sensor networks. 
In this case study, we considered a MAC protocol with active/sleep duty cycle2 to minimize 
the energy consumption of a node. In this MAC protocol time is divided into super-frames, 
and every super frame into two basic parts: active part and sleep part. During the active part 
a node tries to contend the channel if there is any data in buffer and turn down its radio 
during the sleeping part to save energy.  
                                                 
2 We can easily relate the “Considered MAC Protocol” with available MAC protocols and 
standards for wireless sensor networks, as most of the popular MAC protocols are based on 
the active/sleep cycle mechanism.     
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In incomplete cooperative game, the considered MAC protocol can be modeled as stochastic 
game, which starts when there is a data packet in the node’s transmission buffer and ends 
when the data packet is transmitted successfully or discarded.  This game consists of many 
time slots and each time slot represents a game slot.  As every node can try to transmit an 
unsuccessful data packet for some predetermined limit (Maximum retry limit), the game is 
finitely repeated rather than an infinitely repeated one. In each time slot, when the node is in 
active part, the node just not only tries to contend for the medium but also estimates the 
current game state based on history. After estimating the game state, the node adjusts its 
own equilibrium condition by adjusting its available parameters under the given strategies 
(here it is contention parameters like transmitting probability, collision probability, etc.). 
Then all the nodes act simultaneously with their best evaluated strategies. In this game we 
considered mainly three strategies available to nodes: Transmitting, Listening, and Sleeping. 
And contention window size as the parameter to adjust its equilibrium strategy.    
In this stochastic game our main goal is to find an optimal equilibrium to maximize the 
network performance with minimum energy consumption. In general, with control theory 
we could achieve the best performance for an individual node rather than a whole network, 
and for this reason our game theoretic approach to the problem is justified.  
Based on the game model presented in (L. Zhao et. al, 2008), the utility function of the node 
(node i) is represented by ( , )µ µ=i i i is s  and the utility function of its opponents as 
( , )µ µ=i i i is s . Here, 1 2 1( , , , , , )−= … …i i ns s s s s  represents the strategy profile of a node and is of 
its opponent nodes, respectively.  From the aforementioned discussion we can represent the 
above game as in table 2.  
 
 Player 2 ( all other n nodes ) 
 Transmitting Listening Sleeping 
Transmitting ( , )f fP P  ( , )s iP P  ( , )f wP P  
Listening ( , )i sP P  ( , )i iP P  ( , )i wP P  
Player 1 
(Node i) 
Sleeping ( , )w fP P  ( , )w iP P  ( , )w wP P  
Table 2. Strategy table  
As presented in (L. Zhao et. al, 2008), we define iP  and iP  as the payoff for player 1 and 2 
when they are listening, sP  and  sP  when they are transmitting a data packet successfully, 
fP  and  fP  when they are failed to transmit successfully, and  wP  and wP  when they are in 
sleep mode, respectively.  Whatever will be the payoff values, their self evident relationship 
is given by 
 < < <f i w SP P P P   (1) 
and similar relationship goes for player 2. As per our goal we are looking for the strategy 
that can lead us to an optimum equilibrium of the network. As in (L. Zhao et. al, 2008) we 
can define it formally as  
 
* *
* *
arg max ( , ) | ( )
arg max ( , ) | ( )
µ
µ
⎧ = <⎪⎨
= <⎪⎩
i
i
i i i i i i
s
i i i i i i
s
s s s e e
s s s e e
 (2) 
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where *, ,i i ie e e  and 
*
ie   are the real energy consumption and energy limit of the player 1 and 
2, respectively.  Now to realize these conditions in practical approach we redefine them as 
follows  
 
,
,
*
*
( )
*
( )
[(1 )(1 )(1 )(1 ) (1 )(1 )(1 )
arg max
(1 )(1 )(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) ] | ( )
[(1 )(1 )(1 ) (1 )(1 )(1 )
arg max
(
τ
τ
τ τ τ τ
τ τ τ
τ τ τ
τ τ
− − − − + − − −
=
+ − − − + − + − <
− − − + − − −
=
+ +
i i
i i
i i i i i s i i i i i
i
w
i i i i i f i i i f i i w i i
i i i i s i i i i
i
w i i f i
p w w P w w P
s
p w w P p w P w w P e e
w w P w w P
s
P w *1 ) ] | ( )
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪
− <⎪⎩ i w i iw P e e
 (3) 
Here, we define iτ  and  iτ  as the transmission probability of the player 1 and player 2, 
respectively. Similarly,  iw  and  iw  represents the sleeping probability of player 1 and 
player 2 while ip  is the conditional collision probability of player 2. Here we could not go 
into many details about these equations due to space limitation, so readers are referred to 
(S.Mehta et al., 2009) for more details on the same.   
From the strategy table and equation (3) we can see that every node has to play its strategies 
with some probabilities as here the optimum equilibrium is in mixed strategy form. In 
addition, we can observe from the above equations that players can achieve their optimal 
response by helping each other to achieve their optimal utility. So the nodes have to play a 
cooperative game under the given constrained of energy.    
As we mentioned earlier every node change its strategies by adjusting contention window 
size (i.e. properly estimating the number of competing nodes). There are some methods, 
especially (G. Bianchi et al., 2003, T. Vercauteren et al, 2007), to name a few, to accurately 
predict the number of competing nodes in the networks , however they are too complex and 
heavy to implement in wireless sensor networks.  Also, we cannot expect to find an 
algorithm that can give the theoretical optimum solution, as the above mentioned problem 
has been proven to be NP-hard (M. S. Garey et al., 1979). So in this case study we present a 
sub optimal and a simple solution to achieve the optimum performance of a network.   
3.2 Improved backoff  
In this section we briefly introduce the improved backoff   (IB), for more details on the same 
readers are refereed to (S.Mehta et al., 2009). This is very simple scheme to integrate with 
any energy efficient MAC protocols for WSNs. This method doesn’t require any complex or 
hard method to estimate the number of nodes. Furthermore, IB can easily accommodate the 
changing dynamics of WSNs.  
IB Mechanism: 
In contrast to traditional backoff scheme, IB scheme uses a small and fixed CW.  In IB 
scheme, nodes choose non-uniform geometrically increasing probability distribution (P) for 
picking a transmission slot in the contention window. Nodes which are executing IB scheme 
pick a slot in the range of (1, CW) with the probability distribution P. Here, CW is 
contention window and its value is fixed. More information on CW we will be presented in 
the later sections of this paper.  Figure 8 shows the probability distribution P. The higher slot 
numbers have higher probability to get selected by nodes compared to lower slot numbers. 
In physical meaning we can explain this as: at the start node select a higher slot number for 
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its CW by estimating large population of active nodes (n) and keep sensing the channel 
status. If no nodes transmits in the first or starting slots then each node adjust its estimation 
of competing nodes by multiplicatively increasing its transmission probability for the next 
slot selection cycle. Every node keeps repeating the process of estimation of active nodes in 
every slot selection cycle and allows the competition to happen at geometrically–decreasing 
values of n all within the fixed contention window (CW).  In contrast to the probability 
distribution P, in uniform distribution, as shown in fig. 8 , all the contending nodes have the 
same probability of transmitting in a randomly chosen time slot. Here, it is worth to note 
that IB scheme doesn’t use timer suspension like in IEEE 802.11 to save energy and reduce 
latency in case of a collision. The only problem with the IB is fairness, however, for WSNs, 
fairness is not a problem due to two main reasons. First, overall network performance is 
more important rather than an individual node. Second, all nodes don’t have data to send 
all the time (i.e. unsaturated traffic condition). Using IB may give us the optimum network 
performance as it reduces the collision to minimum.  
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Fig. 8. Difference between uniform and truncated geometric distributions 
3.3 Performance evaluation 
In this subsection we present the performance comparison of incomplete cooperative game, 
ie. Incomplete Game, our “considered” or “normal” MAC protocol, and  IB based MAC 
protocol in terms of channel efficiency, medium access delay and energy-efficiency . Latter 
two protocols are same in nature except for their backoff procedure.  For the performance 
analysis we carried out simulation in Matlab.  The main parameters for our simulation are 
listed in table 3. For calculating the energy consumption in nodes we choose ratio of idle: 
listen: transmit as 1:1:1.5, as measured in (M. Stemm et al., 1997). For the “normal” MAC 
protocol maximum retry limit is set to 3 (m=3), minimum contention window is set to 16 
(also for the IB Based MAC), and traffic model is set to non-saturation. 
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As we have described in previous section channel efficiency is mostly depends on number 
of active nodes and contention window size. As shown in figure 9, at first “Normal MAC” 
(NM) gives high channel throughput at lower number of nodes. The reason is very obvious, 
less collision and low waiting time in backoff procedure, and as number of contenders 
increases channel throughput start decreasing.  In contrast to NM, “IB based MAC” (IBM) 
maintains high channel efficiency due to its unique quality of collision avoidance among the 
competing nodes. In IBM most of the nodes choose higher contention slots while very few 
nodes selects lower contention slots, hence  less or no collision and low waiting time in 
backoff procedure. For “Incomplete Game” channel efficiency almost keep constant after 30 
nodes, as each node can adapt to the variable game state and choose corresponding 
equilibrium strategy. At start it shows lower channel efficiency because contention window 
is still too big for given number of nodes. 
 
Parameters Values 
minCW  16 
Packet size 1024  Bytes 
Nodes 5~100 
Data Rate 1 Mbps 
Transmitting Energy 50x10-6  J/Bit 
Idle/listening  Energy 75x10-6 J/Bit 
Table 3. Simulation Parameters  
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Fig. 9. shows the channel efficiency of “Normal MAC”, “Incomplete Game” and “IB Based 
MAC”.  
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Figure 10 shows the average medium access delay performances of NM, Incomplete Game 
and IBM.  Here, medium access delay is defined as the time elapsed between the generation 
of a request packet and its successful reception. In NM scheme, as a large number of stations 
attempt to access the medium, more collision occurs, the number of retransmissions 
increases and nodes suffer longer delays. In IBM, as we expected access delay is very low 
compared to NM. This is because of low or no collision and less idle waiting time in backoff 
procedure. In “Incomplete Game”, access delay performance is far more better than “NM”, 
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Fig. 10. Average access delay vs. number of nodes 
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Fig. 11. Energy-efficiency vs. number of nodes 
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and comparable with “IBM”, as it take some time to adjust its contention window according 
to number of nodes.  Figure 11 illustrates the impact of CW on energy efficiency of NM, 
incomplete game, and IBM schemes. 
From figure 11 we can see that as number of nodes increases NM scheme waste more energy 
due to increase in  collision and retransmission attempts.  In contrast IBM wastes very less 
energy due to its unique characteristics of collision avoidance. Similarly, “Incomplete 
Game” can also give the comparative performance to IBM, as it also reduces collision by 
adjusting its equilibrium strategy. From all aforementioned results we can see the 
superiority of IBM over NM. Accepting IBM as backoff scheme can increase the overall 
performance of an energy efficient MAC protocol to a large extends and we can also get the 
sub optimal solution for an incomplete cooperative game.  
4. Related works  
Along with the aforementioned examples and a case study there are notable amount of 
work presented in the area of game theory and wireless networks. We summarize some of 
the important current related works/trends as shown in the table 4. As describe in the above 
mentioned games selfish behavior by nodes in a wireless network may lead to a suboptimal 
equilibrium where nodes, through their actions, reach an undesirable steady state from a 
network point of view. Hence, incentive mechanisms are needed to steer nodes towards 
constructive behavior (i.e., towards a desirable equilibrium). Even though the bulk of work 
done in the past few years to answer above mentioned games still they are at a nascent 
stage. 
 
Subject The Proposed work/solution References 
Ad-hoc Networks 
Cooperation with and without 
incentives 
-Currency & reputation 
-Virtual money and Cost  
-Reducing Selfish behaviour  
Sensor Networks 
Cooperative Packet forwarding, Mac 
Protocol, non-cooperative Solutions, 
etc.  
Cognitive radio 
Major works in resource allocation and  
IEEE 802.22 Working Group 
Cellular and Wi-Fi 
Networks 
(WWANs and WLANs) 
Resource Allocation, Selfish behaviour, 
and reputation based networks 
(S.Mehta and K.S 
Kwak, 2007/8, 
and references in 
there.) 
 
Table 4. Summery of related works  
5. Conclusions 
In this chapter, we present the introduction of Game theory and show its application to 
wireless networks.  Game theory can model the various interactions in wireless networks as 
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games at different levels of protocol stack. With these games we can analysis the existing 
Routing/MAC protocols and resource management schemes, as well as the design of 
equilibrium-inducing mechanisms that provide incentives for individual nodes to behave 
inline with the network goals. We also present a case study on IB based MAC protocol as a 
concrete example of applicability of game theory to wireless networks. In short, this chapter 
paper serves three main objectives; first, to model some of the fundamental questions on 
wireless networks as interactive games between the nodes. Second object is to gain our 
understanding on inter-discipline research issues and third to motivate students and 
researchers to peep at this fascinating analytical tool, and encourage them in modeling 
problems of wireless networks. 
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